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Abstract 
 
Changes in monetary policy have surprisingly strong effects on forward real rates in the distant 
future. A 100 basis point increase in the two-year nominal yield on a Federal Open Markets 
Committee announcement day is associated with a 42 basis point increase in the ten-year forward 
real rate. This finding is at odds with standard macro models based on sticky nominal prices, 
which imply that monetary policy cannot move real rates over a horizon longer than that over 
which all prices in the economy can readjust. Instead, the responsiveness of long-term real rates 
to monetary shocks appears to reflect changes in term premia. One mechanism that could 
generate such variation in term premia is based on demand effects due to the existence of what 
we call yield-oriented investors. We find some evidence supportive of this channel. 
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1.  Introduction 
  We show that changes in the stance of monetary policy have surprisingly strong effects 
on very distant forward real interest rates. A 100 basis point (bp) increase in the two-year 
nominal yield on a Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) announcement day, which we use 
as a proxy for changes in expectations regarding the path of the federal funds rate over the 
following several quarters, is associated with a 42 bp increase in the ten-year forward overnight 
real rate, extracted from the yield curve for Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). 
Our findings can be illustrated with the FOMC’s announcement on January 25, 2012. On 
that date the FOMC significantly changed its forward guidance, indicating that it expected to 
hold the federal funds rate near zero “through late 2014.” It had previously stated that it expected 
to do so only “through mid-2013.” In response to this announcement, the expected path of short-
term nominal rates fell significantly from two to five years out, with the two-year nominal yield 
dropping by 5 bps and the five-year nominal yield by 14 bps. More strikingly, ten-year and 20-
year real forward rates declined by 5 bps and 9 bps, respectively. In other words, distant real 
forward rates appeared to react strongly to news about the future stance of monetary policy. 
  This finding is at odds with standard New Keynesian macro models, in which the central 
bank’s ability to influence real variables stems from that fact that goods prices are sticky in 
nominal terms. In such models, a change in monetary policy should have no impact on forward 
real interest rates at a horizon longer than that over which all nominal prices can readjust, and it 
seems implausible to think that this horizon could be anything close to ten years.
1 
  So how does one make sense of our finding? One possibility is that the results are simply 
wrong in some sense; i.e., they are either not robust or noncausal. On the robustness front, one 
limitation of our analysis is that there is a relatively brief sample period in the US over which we 
can study real rates: TIPS were introduced in 1997, and reliable data only became available in 
                                                 
1 See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) for an introduction to the New Keynesian literature and Gali (2008) for a 
more detailed treatment. 2 
 
1999. In an effort to address this concern, we replicate our analysis on UK data over roughly the 
same period and find broadly similar results. 
With respect to causality, a natural concern is that some of the movement in two-year 
nominal yields on FOMC days could be unrelated to monetary policy and could instead reflect 
other macro news that also drives changes in distant forwards. If so, our estimates could suffer 
from an omitted variable bias. To address this concern, we can instead proxy for monetary 
surprises with the change in two-year nominal yields in a narrow 60-minute window surrounding 
FOMC announcements. When we do so, we obtain estimates that are similar to our baseline 
results. 
Another worry is that changes in short-term nominal rates around FOMC announcements 
might not reflect innovations to Federal Reserve policy per se, but rather the revelation of the 
Fed’s private information about the future evolution of the economy. For example, suppose the 
Fed obtains private information suggesting a permanent positive productivity shock. This shock 
could lead the Fed to tighten in the short run and at the same time could raise the natural 
(flexible-price) real interest rate in the economy forever. If so, it would be a mistake to conclude 
that the increase in distant forward real rates was caused by a change in monetary policy. 
Although completely ruling out this possibility is difficult, we can make some progress 
by comparing the results we get for FOMC announcement days with the analogous results for 
non-FOMC days. The idea is that non-FOMC days also have their fair share of macro news but 
are less likely to be informative about shifts in the Fed’s reaction function. Thus, if the elasticity 
of long-term real rates to short-term nominal rates is simply driven by macro news (either 
revealed by Fed actions or released through standard channels), this elasticity should be stronger 
on non-FOMC days, which arguably have a greater proportion of macro news and less reaction-
function news. However, this prediction is not borne out in the data. If anything, we find the 
reverse: distant forward real rates react more strongly to changes in short-term nominal rates on 3 
 
FOMC days than on non-FOMC days. Although not a definitive test, this finding weighs against 
a story based on the Fed having private information about long-run economic fundamentals. 
Assuming that the results can be given a causal interpretation, what economic mechanism 
do they reflect? It is helpful to begin by noting that a movement in the ten-year forward real rate 
can always be decomposed into a change in the expected real rate that will prevail in ten years, 
plus a change in the ten-year real term premium. A movement in the real term premium is 
equivalent to saying that when the Fed raises short-term nominal rates, this increases the 
expected return on a carry-trade strategy that borrows short-term and buys long-term real bonds.
2 
This decomposition suggests two broad economic channels that could be at work. The 
first involves monetary policy somehow moving expected future real rates at very distant 
horizons. If this channel were operative, it would be a form of long-run monetary non-neutrality 
that runs directly counter to the rational-expectations spirit of New Keynesian models. In other 
words, it is hard to see how this channel could be squared with the bedrock assumption in these 
models, namely, that nominal prices are set in a rational, forward-looking manner. 
The alternative possibility is that monetary policy does not move expected future real 
rates far out into the future but instead changes the term premia on long-term bonds. This implies 
that the effects on forward rates that we document should be expected to mean revert over time. 
To test this hypothesis, we proceed as follows. At any time t, we cumulate the changes in long-
term forward rates that occurred solely on FOMC announcement days over the preceding three 
months. We then use these FOMC announcement day changes to forecast changes in forward 
rates over the subsequent 12 months. It turns out that when long-term forward rates rise on an 
FOMC announcement day, this predicts a reversal of forward rates over the next 12 months. The 
                                                 
2 For those more comfortable thinking in terms of stock prices, when a company’s stock price goes up, one can 
always decompose this into news either about its expected future earnings (the analog to news about the expected 
future real rate here) or about its discount rate (the analog to the term premium on a carry-trade strategy). 4 
 
evidence is thus consistent with the proposition that monetary policy shocks induce time 
variation in real term premia.
3 
The question thus arises of why monetary policy could be influencing real term premia. 
In traditional representative-agent asset pricing models, term premia are pinned down by the 
covariance between real bond returns and investors’ marginal utility. It is difficult to see why 
monetary shocks would change this covariance in the required direction, so we focus instead on 
an alternative class of supply and demand-based mechanisms. One specific explanation that we 
flesh out in detail has to do with the existence of what we call yield-oriented investors. We 
assume that these investors allocate their portfolios between short- and long-term bonds and, in 
doing so, care about current portfolio income or yield and not just expected holding-period 
returns. This could be because of agency or accounting considerations that lead investors to 
worry about short-term measures of reported performance. 
A reduction in short-term nominal rates leads these investors to rebalance their portfolios 
toward longer-term bonds in an effort to keep their overall portfolio yield from declining too 
much. This, in turn, creates buying pressure that raises the price of the long-term bonds and, 
hence, lowers long-term real yields and forward rates. The price pressure is independent of 
expectations about the actual path of future short rates; it is a pure term-premium effect. And 
interestingly, according to this hypothesis, conventional monetary policy moves long-term real 
rates in much the same way as some of the Fed’s recent quantitative easing (QE) policy 
measures, such as its purchases of long-term Treasuries. These, too, are presumed to operate 
through a supply and demand effect on term premia as opposed to by changing expectations 
about the future path of rates. 
We go on to provide some evidence that is consistent with our hypothesis about the role 
of yield-oriented investors. We do so by looking at the maturity of securities held by commercial 
                                                 
3 To be clear, none of our evidence directly refutes the long-run non-neutrality hypothesis that policy is somehow 
able to move expected real rates far out into future. Both effects could be simultaneously at work. 5 
 
banks. Banks fit with our conception of yield-oriented investors to the extent that they care about 
their reported earnings, which, given bank accounting rules, are based on current income from 
securities holdings and not mark-to-market changes in value. We find that when the yield curve 
steepens, banks increase the maturity of their securities holdings. Moreover, the magnitudes of 
these portfolio shifts are large in the aggregate, so that if they had to be absorbed by other, less 
yield-oriented investors (e.g., broker-dealers or hedge funds) they could plausibly drive changes 
in market-wide term premia. We also find that primary dealers in the Treasury market—who, 
unlike banks, must mark their securities holdings to market—take the other side of the trade, 
reducing the maturity of their Treasury holdings when the yield curve steepens. 
The ideas in this paper connect to several strands of prior research. A large literature 
examines the impact of monetary policy surprises on long-term nominal interest rates. For 
example, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) find that a 100 bp increase in the one-month eurodollar 
rate around the time of a federal funds target change is associated with a 52 bp increase in ten-
year nominal Treasury yields. They, too, cast this as something of a puzzle, remarking that “the 
size of the coefficients is particularly startling” (p. 92). In a similar vein, Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
Swanson (2005b) show that distant nominal forward rates respond strongly to a variety of 
macroeconomic news releases, including FOMC announcements.
4 
We sharpen the puzzle by focusing on real rates instead of nominal rates, which puts the 
long-run non-neutrality issue front and center. By contrast, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 
(2005b) argue that their results are consistent with a model in which long-run inflation 
expectations are not well anchored and are revised in light of incoming news. According to this 
explanation, monetary shocks could alter long-run inflation expectations but would have no 
impact on long-run real rates. 
                                                 
4 Other papers in this tradition include Cook and Hahn (1989), Evans and Marshall (1998), and Kuttner (2001). 6 
 
More recently, several papers in the monetary economics literature have also noted the 
surprising response of long-term real rates to monetary policy surprises. Gilchrist, Lopez-Salido, 
and Zakrajsek (2013) present evidence that conventional monetary policy has large effects on 
long-term real borrowing rates, and, like us, they argue that this occurs largely because term 
premia react to policy shifts. Gertler and Karadi (2013) augment a standard vector autoregression 
analysis of conventional monetary policy by incorporating data on the high-frequency response 
of interest rates to policy shocks. They find that policy shocks have a modest impact on short-
term nominal rates but, nonetheless, have large effects on the real cost of long-term credit and, 
therefore, on real economic activity. Gertler and Karadi argue that the large response of real 
credit costs is due to the reaction of term premia and credit spreads, factors that are omitted from 
standard models of the monetary transmission mechanism.
5 
Finally, the yield-oriented investors that drive term premia in our model are reminiscent 
of the Rajan (2005) account of investor behavior in a low interest rate environment. And the idea 
that supply and demand effects can have important consequences in the Treasury market is 
central to a number of recent papers, including Vayanos and Vila (2009), Greenwood and 
Vayanos (2010, 2014), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011, 2012), Gagnon, Raskin, 
Remache, and Sack (2011), and Hanson (2014). An important antecedent to this work is 
Modigliani and Sutch (1966).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we document the strong 
sensitivity of long-term real forward rates to monetary policy news and argue that this relation is 
likely to be causal. In Section 3, we make the case that movements in long-term forward rates 
around monetary policy announcements reflect changes in term premia. In Section 4, we 
investigate the mechanism behind these changing term premia. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
5 Instead of reflecting changes in term premia, Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) argue that the large response of 
distant real forwards to policy surprises reflects the fact that nominal price rigidities are far more severe than 
typically assumed. This implies that monetary policy is not neutral even at fairly long horizons. 7 
 
 
2.  The sensitivity of long-term real forward rates to monetary policy news 
We begin by documenting the surprising sensitivity of distant real forward rates to 
monetary policy shocks. We then argue that this relation is likely to be causal. 
2.1.  Measuring monetary policy news 
To get started, we need a measure of monetary policy news. A growing consensus exists 
that changes in the policy outlook are the primary form of monetary policy news on FOMC 
announcement days. Thus, building on Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a) and Campell, 
Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012), our measurement strategy is based on the premise that, at 
least since 1994, a significant portion of the news contained in FOMC announcements is about 
the expected path of the federal funds rates over the next several quarters as opposed to surprise 
changes in the current federal funds rate.
6 
To capture revisions to the full expected path of the funds rate over the coming quarters 
in a simple and transparent manner, we use the change in the two-year nominal Treasury yield on 
FOMC announcement dates as our proxy for monetary policy news. However, as described in 
our robustness tests below, we obtain similar results with a variety of related variables that 
capture revisions in expected short rates over the following several quarters. The key is that these 
variables capture news about the expected medium-term path of interest rates as opposed to news 
only about rates over the coming month or two. 
We use data from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007, 2010) on the nominal Treasury 
yield curve and the real (TIPS) Treasury yield curve as updated regularly by the Federal Reserve 
Board. For each day, they estimate the six-parameter model of the instantaneous forward curve 
                                                 
6 In 1994, the FOMC began issuing a press release with the current federal funds target after every meeting and also 
began releasing announcements discussing the economic and policy outlook. Prior to 1994, the FOMC implicitly 
announced the change in its target via the size and type of the next open-market operation following a policy change 
(typically the day after the FOMC meeting). From 1994 to mid-1999, the FOMC released a statement only when it 
changed the policy target. However, since mid-1999, the FOMC has released a statement following each meeting. 8 
 
proposed by Svensson (1994). Zero-coupon yields are then obtained by integrating along the 
estimated forward curve 
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The n-year nominal zero-coupon yield can be decomposed analogously: 
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In our baseline specification, for an FOMC meeting on day t, we compute changes from 
t–1 to t+1 to capture the full market response to the announcement. Our implicit assumption is 
that the full reaction to an FOMC announcement might not be instantaneous, particularly for 
long-term yields. This could be because investors are uncertain about the implications of a given 
piece of news and update their beliefs as others’ interpretations are revealed via trading volume, 
the price process, and the financial media. Thus, it could take some time for the market to digest 
the information content of an announcement. 
The Treasury market microstructure literature is consistent with this view. Fleming and 
Remolona (1999) find that price formation is gradual with heightened levels of volume and 
volatility lasting 90 or more minutes following major announcements. More relevant for us, 
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a) find that it takes markets time to impound news about 
the future path of rates contained in FOMC statements, but it takes almost no time to impound 
news about the current target. Said differently, it appears to take longer-term yields more time to 
fully react to FOMC announcements. 
Given this evidence, we want to choose a window long enough to span the period of 
elevated post-announcement price volatility. In this context, the timing of our daily Treasury data 9 
 
argues in favor of using a two-day window. Most FOMC announcements in our sample are at 
2:15 p.m., and the Treasury quotes underlying our fitted yields curves are taken from 3:00 p.m. 
closing prices. As a result, a one-day horizon would allow only 45 minutes for long-term yields 
to adjust. Our results our qualitatively similar but somewhat smaller in magnitude, if we instead 
measure changes over the one-day interval from day t–1 to t. 
2.2.  Baseline results for the US 
In our baseline specifications, we regress changes in forward nominal rates, forward real 
rates, and forward break-even inflation rates on changes in two-year nominal yields 
$( ) $(2) $( )
$$     () ()
nn
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() $ ( 2 ) () , () ()
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We focus on FOMC announcement dates from 1999 to February 2012. We exclude five FOMC 
announcement dates that contained significant news about the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases 
(LSAPs; sometimes referred to as QE1, QE2 and Operation Twist).
7 We do so because the 
mechanism underlying long-term rate movements on these dates is potentially different from that 
driving market reactions to more conventional FOMC announcements. 
[Insert Table 1 and Fig. 1 about here] 
Table 1 and Fig. 1 present the basic results. Panel A of Fig. 1 shows how the nominal 
forward curve responds to a 100 bp shock to short-term nominal rates. It plots the coefficients 
from Eq. (4) for maturities n = 5, …, 20 along with 95% confidence intervals. Panel B of Fig. 1 
decomposes the response of nominal forwards into a change in real forwards and forward break-
                                                 
7 The five excluded FOMC announcement dates are March 18. 2009 (QE1), August 10, 2010 (QE2), September 21, 
2010 (QE2), November 3, 2010 (QE2), and September 21, 2011 (Operation Twist). Our results are robust both to 
including these dates and to excluding others (December 16, 2008 and January 28, 2009) that arguably also 
contained some information about the LSAPs. 10 
 
even inflation, plotting the coefficients from Eqs. (5) and (6). By construction, the sum of the 
two coefficients shown in Panel B equals the coefficient in Panel A. Table 1 lists all the 
regression coefficients.  
Table 1 and Fig. 1 show that distant nominal forwards respond significantly to changes in 
short-term nominal rates on FOMC days. And, surprisingly, this response is driven almost 
exclusively by movements in real forwards. A 100 bp shock to the two-year nominal rate on an 
FOMC announcement date is associated with a 45 bp increase in ten-year nominal forwards  
(t = 3.54). And this 45 bp increase can be decomposed into a 42 bp rise in real forwards   
(t = 4.63) and a 3 bp rise in forward break-even inflation (t = 0.23). This pattern holds even as we 
consider more distant forwards. A 100 bp shock to two-year nominal rates is associated with an 
18 bp increase in 20-year nominal forwards (t = 1.32), which reflects a 30 bp rise in real 
forwards (t = 3.15) and a 12 bp decline in forward break-even inflation (t = -0.79). 
Table 2 conducts a variety of robustness exercises. First, we vary the event window. In 
our baseline results, we use a two-day window from day t-1 to day t+1. We also report 
comparable results when using a one-day window from t–1 to t. This leads to somewhat smaller 
effects: a 100 bp shock to the two-year nominal rate is now associated with a 25 bp rise in ten-
year nominal forwards (t = 2.98), a 22 bp rise in real forwards (t = 2.90), and a 2 bp rise in 
forward break-even inflation (t = 0.30).
8  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Next we try using a variety of alternative measures of short-run nominal rates in place of 
two-year Treasury yields: one-year Treasury yields, federal funds futures, and eurodollar futures 
contracts. The basic take-away is that everything works similarly with any variable that captures 
news about the medium-term path of rates as opposed to one that captures only what the target 
                                                 
8 The decline in the coefficient is largely due to the use of a two-day window for long-term yields on the left-hand 
side of the regression. If we use a two-day window for long-term yields on the left-hand side and a one-day window 
for short-term yields on the right-hand side, we obtain b = 0.414 (t = 3.04), which is very close to our baseline result. 11 
 
will be in the next few weeks. This is shown explicitly when we construct the “future path of 
policy” news factor as in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a). We also vary the sample. For 
example, we add dates with major news about QE policies or the dates on which FOMC minutes 
are released. This has little impact on the results. 
Finally, because TIPS are known to carry a smaller liquidity premium than nominal 
Treasuries, one could wonder whether we obtain a similar decomposition of nominal forwards 
into real and break-even inflation using inflation swaps as opposed to TIPS.
9 A persistent 
liquidity differential is not a concern given our high-frequency empirical strategy.
 However, we 
want to know if our results reflect monetary policy-induced changes in liquidity premia. We 
investigate this in two ways. First, we use inflation swap yields and nominal yields to back out a 
synthetic real yield. Second, we examine whether proxies for the equilibrium price of liquidity 
do, in fact, respond to monetary policy. 
The last row in Table 2 uses data on zero-coupon inflation swaps to construct a synthetic 
real forward, defined as the forward rate implied by nominal Treasuries less forward inflation 
implied by swaps. This approach yields point estimates that are somewhat larger than those 
based on TIPS, though the difference is not statistically significant. 
We examine the behavior of a standard proxy for the price of liquidity: the yield spread 
between off-the-run and on-the-run Treasuries (Krishnamurthy, 2002). We regress the change in 
the yield spread between the old on-the-run and current on-the-run ten-year nominal Treasury on 
the change in two-year nominal yields around FOMC announcements. Doing so, we find little 
evidence that monetary surprises impact the price of liquidity: the estimated coefficient is b = –
0.004 (t = –0.39). In combination, these exercises suggest that changes in liquidity premia play 
little role in explaining our results. 
                                                 
9 TIPS are very liquid, but nominal Treasuries are the most liquid asset class in global markets. As a result, nominal 
Treasuries command a liquidity premium relative to private bonds (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012) as 
well as relative to TIPS (Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig, 2013; and Pflueger and Viceira, 2013). 12 
 
2.3.  Parallel results for the UK 
To further investigate the robustness of our results, we run the analogous set of 
regressions using UK data. To do so, we rely on the yield curve estimates published by the Bank 
of England (BOE), which employ the spline-based techniques described in Andersen and Sleath 
(2001). We estimate Eqs. (4), (5), and (6) on all monetary policy announcement dates since 
1994.
10 Our proxy for news on announcement dates is the change in the two-year nominal yield. 
We compute changes from t-1 to t+1 for meetings on day t. And we drop six announcement dates 
from 2009 to 2011, when there was significant news about the BOE’s quantitative easing 
operations.
11 
Table 3 and Fig. 2 present the basic results for the UK. The estimates are qualitatively 
similar to those from the US, although the magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller in the 
UK.  In particular, for the ten-year forward real rate, the coefficient on the two-year nominal 
yield is 0.254 in the UK as compared with 0.421 in the US. 
[Insert Table 3 and Fig. 2 about here] 
2.4.  Do monetary policy shocks cause the movements in distant real forward rates? 
One could worry that some of the movements in two-year yields on FOMC days are due 
not to monetary policy surprises but rather other fundamental macro news that also impacts 
distant forwards. Because we do not control for other macro news, our ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions will yield biased estimates of the effect of monetary policy on distant real 
forwards if fundamental macro news has a different effect on forwards than monetary policy. To 
deal with this concern, we follow Gertler and Karadi (2013) and Gilchrist, Lopez-Salido, and 
Zakrajsek (2013) and estimate our baseline specifications using the intraday change in two-year 
                                                 
10 Although the UK has issued inflation-linked bonds since 1985, UK authorities began holding regularly scheduled 
monetary policy meetings analogous to those held by the FOMC only in 1994, so we begin our analysis then. 
11 The list is based on Table A in Joyce, Tong, and Woods (2011). The dates are March 5, 2009, May 7, 2009, 
August 6, 2009, November 5, 2009, February 4, 2010, and October 6, 2011. 13 
 
yields in a narrow 60-minute window around each FOMC announcement as an instrument for the 
two-day change in two-year yields.
12 The exclusion restriction here is that movements in two-
year yields in this 60-minute window solely reflect monetary policy surprises. This seems 
plausible because almost all FOMC announcements in our sample occur at roughly 2:15 p.m., 
macroeconomic data is almost always released at 8:30 a.m. or 10:00 a.m., and almost all major 
corporate news is released after stock exchanges close at 4:00 p.m. 
As shown in Row 2 of Table 4, this instrumental variables (IV) procedure produces point 
estimates that are a bit larger than our baseline OLS estimates. Following Gilchrist, Lopez-
Salido, and Zakrajsek (2013), we add squares and cubes of the intraday change as instruments in 
Row 3 because they add explanatory power for the two-day change in two-year yields. Using 
these additional instruments has little effect on our IV estimates. Fig. 3 redoes Fig. 1 with this 
instrumental variables estimator. In summary, our results are similar whether we measure 
monetary policy surprises using two-day changes or using 60-minute intraday changes. In this 
sense, our findings are consistent with those of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a), who, 
after comparing daily and intraday data, conclude that “the surprise component of monetary 
policy announcements can be measured very well using just daily data” (p. 66). 
[Insert Table 4 and Fig. 3 about here] 
A distinct concern is that the Fed’s policy announcement is simply a response to its 
private information about the future evolution of the economy, and it is the release of the Fed’s 
private information—as opposed to news about its reaction function—that moves long-term real 
rates. For example, suppose the Fed has private information that the economy’s long-run growth 
potential is weaker than previously believed. This could cause the Fed to ease policy, reducing 
                                                 
12 We obtain the precise announcement times from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a) and Lucca and Moench 
(2013). Given the microstructure evidence, we use the 60-minute announcement window from Gürkaynak, Sack, 
and Swanson (2005a), which begins 15 minutes prior to the announcement and ends 45 minutes after. We are 
grateful to Refet Gürkaynak for sharing his intraday data on yield changes surrounding FOMC announcements. The 
underlying data source for intraday changes in Treasury yields is GovPX. 14 
 
the expected path of nominal rates over the next several quarters. And, once disclosed, the same 
information could also lead investors to expect the long-run natural real rate to decline. However, 
the movement in long-term real rates would not be a causal consequence of monetary policy in 
this case, as it would have happened even had the Fed chosen not to ease. 
This reverse-causality story is already somewhat suspect on an a priori basis, because it 
presumes that the Fed has material private information about the very long-run evolution of the 
economy. And a variety of studies have shown that the Fed does not have any forecasting 
advantage relative to private analysts more than a few quarters into the future.
13 
Nevertheless, we take a crude stab at testing this reverse-causality hypothesis. To do so, 
we compare our results with those on all non-FOMC announcement days. The intuition for this 
experiment is as follows. Non-FOMC days see the release of a variety of fundamental macro 
news items (the same kind of macro news that the Fed is ostensibly revealing with its FOMC 
announcements in the private-information story) but are less likely to bring news about the Fed’s 
reaction function. Thus, if the elasticity of long-term real rates to short-term nominal rates is 
simply driven by macro news, as is posited in the reverse-causality hypothesis, this elasticity 
should be stronger on non-FOMC days, which arguably have a greater relative proportion of 
macro news as compared with reaction-function news. 
To implement the test, we estimate 
$(2) $(2) () () ,
tt
TIPS n TIPS n
tt t t yy fa bc F O M C dF O M C             (7) 
for n = 5, 10, and 20, using all days in the sample. The results are displayed in Table 5. The key 
coefficient of interest is that on the interaction term, d, which captures how the elasticity of long-
term real forward rates to short-term nominal rates on FOMC days differs from that on non-
                                                 
13 Romer and Romer (2000) argue that Fed inflation forecasts for the coming quarters outperformed those of private 
forecasters from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. By contrast, Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) argue that 
FOMC policy surprises contain little information that could be used to improve macroeconomic forecasts and that 
private forecasters do not appear to revise their forecasts in response to policy surprises. Regardless, no argument 
appears in the literature that the Fed has a significant forecasting advantage at anything close to a ten-year horizon. 15 
 
FOMC days. According to the reverse-causality hypothesis, this coefficient should be negative. 
In fact, it is generally positive, although only marginally significant. The point estimates for ten-
year real forwards suggest that the elasticity on non-FOMC days is 0.268 as compared with a 
value of 0.421 on FOMC days. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  Thus, the results in Table 5 fail to support the reverse-causality hypothesis. However, this 
is not the same thing as having a clean instrument for exogenous shocks to the Fed’s reaction 
function. So, while we believe the balance of the evidence favors a causal interpretation of the 
role of monetary policy on long-term real forwards, the identification is admittedly not airtight. 
 
3.  Changes in expected future rates versus changes in term premia 
If one accepts the premise that monetary policy has an important causal impact on long-
term real forward rates, then the natural question to ask is whether this reflects changes in 
expected future real rates or changes in term premia. If it is the former, this would represent a 
direct challenge to the notion that monetary policy is neutral in the long run, because the 
implication would be that a change in policy today has a large effect on the expected level of the 
real rate ten years or more into the future. If it is the latter, this opens the door to a novel 
monetary transmission channel. And one would then want to understand the strength and 
persistence of this term premium effect as well as the economic mechanisms that give rise to it. 
As a matter of bond accounting, a change in the n-year forward rate can always be 
decomposed into a change in the expected rate that will prevail in n–1 years plus a change in the 
n-year term premium.
14 Letting 
() n
t f  be the n-year forward rate at time t, 
()
1
n
t r  the realized return 
                                                 
14We work with one-year forward rates here as opposed to the instantaneous forward rates used above. We do this to 
exploit the simple decompositions for one-year forward rates, but this has only a trivial impact on the estimates. 
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on an n-period zero-coupon bond from t to t+1, and 
(1)
t y  the yield on a one-period bond at time t, 
it is easy to show that, for changes in distant forward rates over a short horizon,  
News about future term premia News about future short rates
1 () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( )
1 1 [] [( ) ] .
n nn j n j
tt t t j t j tn j fE y E r r
  
       
  
 (8) 
In other words, unexpected changes in long-dated forward rates must reflect either news about 
expected short rates in the distant future or news about future term premia. This is similar to the 
Campbell (1991) observation that unexpected stock returns must either be due to cash flow news 
or discount-rate news. 
3.1.  Forecasting regressions 
To develop a test of whether movements in distant forward rates reflect news about future 
short rates or news about future term premia, we run regressions in which we use three-month 
changes in the forward rate, 
() ()
1/4
nn
tt f f   , to forecast subsequent changes in forward rates over a 
12-month horizon, 
(1 ) ( )
1
nn
tt f f

  . Because
(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
11 1 ()
nn n n
tt t t ff r r

    , this is directly equivalent 
to a test of Eq. (8). That is, if movements in forward rates were informative only about future 
short rates and not about excess bond returns, there would be no predictable mean reversion in 
forward rates. Conversely, if we do find evidence of mean reversion in forward rates, this maps 
into a particular trading strategy that earns excess returns. For example, if the ten-year forward 
rate jumps today and is expected to fall back over the next year, this is the same as saying that 
ten-year bonds are expected to outperform nine-year bonds over the next year. 
We face an important data limitation in this forecasting exercise. Ideally, we would like 
to do everything in real terms, because our focus thus far has been on real rates. However, given 
the short span of the TIPS data and the fact that we are working with 12-month returns, this 
                                                                                                                                                             
too, that Eq. (8) is strictly true only over short intervals in which expected excess returns are near zero. More 
generally, only unexpected changes in forwards—equivalently, unexpected bond returns—contain news. 17 
 
leaves only a dozen fully independent observations. Therefore, we worry about relying solely on 
TIPS forecasting regressions from 1999 to 2011. 
We first focus on the nominal data, which allow us to consider a longer sample. We 
restrict attention to the post-1987 (post-Paul Volcker) period in which inflation expectations have 
been relatively well anchored in the US. It seems plausible to use the nominal data as a proxy for 
the missing real data over this period. In particular, our key independent variable is the change in 
the ten-year forward rate on FOMC announcement days. For the post-1999 period for which we 
have data on both, the correlation between the real and the nominal versions of this variable is 
0.77. And the correlation between the nominal and real versions of our dependent variable, the 
change in forwards over 12-month intervals, is 0.82. This suggests that using nominal data in 
place of real data to extend the sample is a reasonable way to proceed. 
Panel A of Table 6 presents these forecasting results. In Column 1, we begin by 
estimating the univariate regression 
$(9) $(10) $(10) $(10) $(10)
11 / 4 1 () . tt t t t ff a b f f         (9) 
That is, we use the change in the ten-year nominal forward rate over the prior quarter to predict 
the change in forward rates over the following 12 months.
15 Again, as a benchmark, one would 
expect  b = 0 under the expectations hypothesis. (Because 
$(10) $(9)
1 [] tt t fE f    under the 
expectations hypothesis, it should be impossible to forecast
$(9) $(10) $(9) $(9)
11 1 [] tt t t t ff fE f     .) We 
obtain b = –0.343 (t = –3.21), implying that a 100 bp rise in the nominal forward rate in a given 
quarter is associated with a 34 bp decline over the following 12 months. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
                                                 
15 The regressions are estimated with monthly data, so each month we are forecasting the excess return over the 
following 12 months. To deal with the overlapping nature of returns, t-statistics are based on Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation at up to 18 lags. 18 
 
  In Column 2 we present instrumental variables (IV) estimates of Eq. (9) using 
$(2) $(2)
1/4 tt yy    as an instrument for 
$(10) $(10)
1/4 tt ff   . These IV estimates enable us to examine the 
reversion following movements in forward rates that are themselves a response to changes in 
short rates. The large IV estimates suggest that the response of forwards to changes in short rates 
is quickly reverted away. The IV estimate of b = –1.078 (t = –2.13) implies that the initial 
response is completely reversed within 12 months. Thus, the IV estimates are consistent with the 
idea that the response of distant forwards to short rates primarily reflects movements in term 
premia as opposed to changes in expected short rates. 
Columns 3 and 4 show that similar results hold when we control for the forward rate 
spread 
$(10) $(1)
tt f y   (i.e., the difference between the ten-year forward rate and the short rate) as in 
Fama and Bliss (1987). Our results also hold up if we control for other bond forecasting 
variables, including the term spread as in Campbell and Shiller (1991) or linear combinations of 
forward rates as in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Cieslak and Povala (2013).  
In Column 5 we break down the change in the ten-year forward rate into the component 
that occurs on FOMC days and the component that occurs on other non-FOMC days, and we use 
these separately as predictive variables: 
$(10) $(9) $(10) $(10) $(10) $(10) $(10)
11 / 4 1 / 4 1 () () . tt tt F O M Ctt N O N F O M C t ff a b ff c ff             (10) 
This approach is more tightly connected to our earlier findings, as it allows us to focus on those 
changes in forward rates that are associated with monetary policy announcements. The cost is 
that it sacrifices considerable statistical power, given the small number of FOMC days. 
As shown in Column 5, the coefficient on the FOMC days part of the forward rate change 
(b = –0.564, with a t-statistic of –1.69) is somewhat larger than its counterpart for non-FOMC 
days (c = –0.321, with a t-statistic of –2.86). The IV estimates, in which we instrument for 
$(10) $(10)
1/4 () tt F O M C ff   and 
$(10) $(10)
1/4 () t t NONFOMC ff    with 
$(2) $(2)
1/4 () tt F O M C yy    and 
$(2) $(2)
1/4 () t t NONFOMC yy   , 
respectively, also result in a larger coefficient for the FOMC days piece than the non-FOMC 19 
 
days piece. Although the statistical significance of the FOMC days piece is marginal, the point 
estimates suggest that movements in forward rates on FOMC days contain just as much and 
perhaps even slightly more discount rate news as those on non-FOMC days. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the real analogs to Eqs. (9) and (10) for the post-1999 period. 
Reassuringly, we obtain similar point estimates using the TIPS data over this shorter sample 
period.
16 For example, the coefficient on the change in the real forward rate on FOMC 
announcement days from the OLS regression in Column 5 is –0.567 (t = –2.05) as compared 
with a value of –0.564 in the nominal data using data back to 1987. 
Whether the sample period is post-1987 or post-1999, any attempt to forecast annual 
bond returns with a relatively small number of independent observations should be viewed with a 
healthy dose of skepticism. At the same time, it is important to be clear on the competing 
theories that are at play in this case and how they could shape one’s priors. Often, when one is 
trying to predict asset returns, the null of no predictability has a strong ex ante theoretical 
standing, and so it could make sense to set a high bar for rejecting the null. But, in this case, 
recall that a null of no predictability is equivalent to the proposition that monetary policy shocks 
have a powerful effect on expected real rates ten years into the future; in other words, monetary 
policy is non-neutral over very long horizons. For somebody who finds such a proposition hard 
to swallow, our forecasting results offer an alternative interpretation that could be more 
palatable, even if the statistical significance of these results is not overwhelming. 
3.2.  Impulse response functions 
Another way to illustrate the mean reversion of forward rates is to examine their impulse 
response to an initial shock to short rates. To do this, we again work with daily data and the ten-
year instantaneous forward rate. We begin by separately estimating 
                                                 
16 One wrinkle is that we do not observe the short-term real rate, which is needed to compute the forward rate spread 
for long-term real bonds. Following Pflueger and Viceira (2011), we estimate the short-term real rate as the fitted 
value from a regression of the realized real bill return on a number of covariates. 20 
 
$(10) $(10) $(2) $(2) $(10)
1$ $ 1 1 () ()( , ) tk t t t tk ffa k b k y y           (11) 
for k = 1, …, 250, using all days in the sample. That is, we regress the cumulative change in ten-
year nominal forwards from day t-1 to day t+k on the change in short-term rates from t-1 to t+1. 
These 250 regressions differ only in terms of the left-hand-side variable, namely, the horizon 
over which we compute the cumulative subsequent change in ten-year forwards.  
Panel A of Fig. 4 plots the coefficient b$(k) from estimating Eq. (11) on all days (i.e., 
FOMC and non-FOMC) using data back to 1987. The graph shows that a 100 bp shock to short-
term nominal rates generates a 51 bp impulse to ten-year nominal forwards upon impact, i.e., for 
k = 1. This effect is then gradually reverted away over the following nine months, consistent with 
the idea that the initial response reflects a change in the term premium as opposed to news about 
short rates. Panel B repeats the same exercise, restricting attention to only FOMC announcement 
dates. Consistent with our prior findings, the picture suggests that an FOMC day impulse to 
forward rates dissipates especially rapidly. However, as shown by the wide confidence intervals 
in Panel B, the standard errors increase by a factor of three or four when we focus on just FOMC 
days, so any inferences about the exact timing of the mean reversion are necessarily tentative in 
this case. 
[Insert Fig. 4 about here] 
We next turn to the TIPS data for the post-1999 period and estimate 
(10) (10) $(2) $(2) (10)
11 1 () ()( . )
TIPS TIPS TIPS
t k t TIPS TIPS t t t k ffa k b k y y           (12) 
Panel C plots the coefficient bTIPS(k) from estimating Eq. (12) on all days. The results in Panel C 
show that, averaging across all days, a 100 bp shock to nominal short rates is associated with a 
27 bp increase in the ten-year real forward upon impact, which gradually dissipates over the 
following nine months. Finally, Panel D does the same thing, but focusing only on FOMC 
announcement dates. The initial impulse upon impact is 42 bps, which is, by construction, the 
same as our baseline estimate from Table 2. As in Panel B, the point estimates make it appear 21 
 
that this effect is largely reverted away in just a few months, but, again, the large standard errors 
associated with restricting attention to just FOMC days preclude precise inferences.  
 
4.  Why does monetary policy move real term premia? 
We began by showing that monetary policy shocks are associated with large changes in 
distant real forward rates and by arguing that this association is likely to be causal in nature. 
Next, we showed that these changes in distant forward rates appear to reflect variation in term 
premia as opposed to changes in expected future short rates. This leaves a fundamental question: 
what is the economic mechanism by which innovations to monetary policy influence real term 
premia? 
Broadly speaking, one can tell two types of stories. The first appeals to the standard 
consumption-based asset pricing model in which the real term premium is pinned down by the 
covariance between real bond returns and the marginal utility of the representative investor. We 
discuss this theory below and argue that it is unlikely to explain our results. 
An alternative class of models is one in which markets are partially segmented, and term 
premia are determined by supply and demand effects. This is how most observers have thought 
about the effects of the Fed’s recent quantitative easing policies, for example. These models are 
somewhat institutional by nature, so one can imagine many variations on the basic theme. For 
concreteness, we develop a particular supply and demand story based on a set of investors who 
care about the current yield on their portfolios. When short-term rates are low, these investors 
reach for yield by purchasing long-term bonds, which pushes down long-term real forward rates 
and lowers the term premium. We then provide some evidence that is consistent with the 
existence of this reaching-for-yield channel. 
4.1.  Real term premia in a consumption-based asset pricing model 
According to the standard consumption-based asset pricing model, the expected excess 
return on long-term real bonds at time t is given by 22 
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where the real stochastic discount factor (SDF), Mt+1, depends on the marginal utility of a 
diversified representative investor. In light of Eq. (13), there are three ways to explain the finding 
that the real term premium falls when the Fed eases. 
First, unexpected shifts in monetary policy could affect the volatility of bond returns 
t[RL,t+1]. However, to explain our results using this mechanism, one would further need to argue 
that a surprise easing lowers conditional volatility meaningfully, whereas a surprise tightening 
raises conditional volatility. Such an asymmetry seems difficult to motivate a priori, and little 
evidence exists for it in the data.
17 
Second, shifts in monetary policy could impact Corrt[RL,t+1,–Mt+1]. On the nominal side, 
Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2013) argue that the correlation between inflation and the real 
SDF could vary over time, so this term could play a role in explaining time variation in inflation 
risk premium. It is less clear why the correlation between real bond returns and the real SDF 
would vary and, particularly, why it would vary meaningfully at high frequencies in response to 
FOMC announcements. 
Finally, consider explanations that involve changes in t[Mt+1], the mechanism that 
generates time-varying risk premia in most modern consumption-based models. These models, 
including habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), long-run risks (Bansal and Yaron, 
2004), and time-varying disaster risk (Gabaix, 2012), share a common reduced form: t[Mt+1] is 
high during bad economic times and low during good times. However, for them to be relevant 
for our purposes, one would have to believe that changes in the stance of monetary policy 
                                                 
17 Lee (2002) estimates generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models that enable him 
to estimate the impact of a surprise FOMC easing separately versus a surprise tightening on interest rate volatility. 
While a surprise tightening has a larger impact on volatility than a surprise easing, the evidence suggests that both 
positive and negative surprises raise volatility. 23 
 
actively cause instead of simply respond to changes in things such as long-run disaster 
probabilities. This seems like something of a stretch. 
4.2.  A supply and demand model with yield-oriented investors 
An alternative explanation for why monetary policy can move term premia is based on 
supply and demand effects that operate in partially segmented bond markets. We illustrate this 
point with a simple model featuring a set of investors who care about the current yield on their 
portfolios. The key assumptions of the model are as follows. There are two dates, 1 and 2. The 
real log short rate at time 1, r1, is set by the central bank. The real log short rate at time 2, r2, is 
initially uncertain. Moreover, monetary policy is assumed to be neutral in the long run. Thus, 
both E[r2] and Var[r2] are outside of the time 1 control of the central bank and should be thought 
of as pinned down by long-run macroeconomic fundamentals. The only endogenous variable is 
y2, the time 1 log yield on real long-term (two-period) bonds, and our interest is in seeing how y2 
varies with the stance of monetary policy as summarized by r1. 
A fraction   of investors are yield-oriented with nonstandard preferences described 
below, and a fraction (1 – ) are expected return-oriented with conventional mean-variance 
preferences. Both investor types have unit risk tolerance. 
Expected return-oriented investors have zero initial wealth and construct long-short 
positions to maximize E[wR] – Var[wR]/2, where wR is their future wealth. If they purchase bR 
units of long-term bonds and finance this position by rolling over short-term borrowing, their 
future wealth is  212 (2 ) RR wb yr r   .
18 Thus, expected return-oriented investors solve 
 
2
21 2 2 max (2 [ ]) [ ]/ 2 ,
R bR R by r E rb V a r r      (14) 
and their demand for long-term bonds is 
                                                 
18 We work with log returns to facilitate the exposition. This can be viewed as a linear approximation to a model 
based on simple returns. Specifically, the two-period excess simple return on a strategy of buying two-period bonds, 
financed by rolling over short-term debt, is  1          1      1       2              , where   l n    .  24 
 
1
22 2 1 2 ( ) ( [ ]) (2 [ ]). R by V a r r y rE r
    (15) 
By contrast, yield-oriented investors pick their holdings of long-term bonds bY, to solve 
 
2
21 2 max (2 2 ) [ ]/ 2 .
bY YY byr b V a r r     (16) 
The only difference between Eqs. (16) and (14) is that in Eq. (16) we have replaced E[r2] in the 
first term with r1. The interpretation is that yield-oriented investors care about the spread in 
current yield between long- and short-term bonds (as captured by  21 22 yr  ) as opposed to the 
spread in expected returns (as captured by  21 2 2[ ] yrE r   ). Said differently, if the yield curve is 
upward-sloping simply because E[r2] exceeds r1, long-term bonds would be more attractive to 
the yield-oriented investors but not to the expected return-oriented investors. Thus, the demand 
for long-term bonds from yield-oriented investors depends on the difference in current income 
from owning long- versus short-term bonds: 
1
22 2 1 ()( [ ] ) ( 2 2 ) . Y by V a r r y r
   (17) 
We assume there is a fixed supply Q of long-term real bonds. The market clearing 
condition for long-term bonds is 
**
22 ()( 1 ) () YR Qb y b y     , which implies that the 
equilibrium long-term forward rate is 

Forward rate Expected short rate Term premium
*
21 2 2 2 1  2[ ] [ ] ( [ ] ) . yr E r Q V a r r E rr     
 
 (18) 
Similarly, the expected excess return on long-term bonds is 
Traditional term premium Reaching-for-yield term premium
*
22 1 2 2 1 2[ ] [ ] ( [ ] ) . yE rr Q V a r r E rr      
  
 (19) 
Eqs. (18) and (19) show that the term premium has two components. A traditional component, 
2 [] QV a rr  , depends on bond supply and fundamental uncertainty, and a reaching-for-yield 
component,  21 ([] ) Er r   , depends on the fraction of yield-oriented investors and the level of 
short-term interest rates. 25 
 
The reaching-for-yield term in Eqs. (18) and (19) is what enables the model to rationalize 
our prior findings, namely, that an easing of monetary policy is associated with a decline in 
distant real forwards and a decline in the real term premium. When the central bank cuts the 
short rate,  21 [] Er r   rises and the term premium falls. Intuitively, this is because yield-oriented 
investors are hungrier for current income when  1 r  is low. As a result, they are willing to take on 
more duration risk by purchasing higher-yielding long-term bonds. And due to the limited risk 
tolerance of investors on the other side of the trade, this shift in demand lowers the term 
premium on these long-term bonds. This explanation draws no distinction between movements 
in rates on FOMC versus non-FOMC days. It does not matter whether rates move due to news 
about the Fed’s reaction function or news about macroeconomic fundamentals. Yield-oriented 
investors care about the differential current yield from holding long-term bonds irrespective of 
its root cause. 
Why, according to this view, would one expect this lower term premia to accrue largely 
over the following 12 months? There are a few possibilities. A decline in short rates could only 
temporarily boost demand for long-term Treasuries from yield-oriented investors. Perhaps some 
yield-oriented investors initially respond to a drop in short rates by taking on more duration risk, 
but over time they instead shift toward taking on more credit risk. Alternatively, if arbitrage 
capital moves slowly in response to changes in risk-adjusted returns, the demand shock from 
yield-oriented investors could be met with increased arbitrageur capital over time. Or, following 
Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010), the increased demand for long-term bonds could be 
gradually accommodated by nonfinancial firms that adjust their debt maturity in response to 
shifts in investor demand.  
4.3.  Evidence on the behavior of yield-oriented investors 
  In addition to rationalizing the movements in real forward rates and term premia shown 
in Sections 2 and 3, the model offers an additional set of predictions. Specifically, if we can 26 
 
identify a priori those investors who are most prone to be yield oriented, their holdings of long-
term bonds should be increasing in the yield spread. This follows immediately from Eq. (17), 
which says that the demand of yield-oriented investors is a function of  21 () yr  . 
  The holdings of the investing public as a whole must equal the fixed supply of long-term 
bonds, so there must be other investors (e.g., broker-dealers or hedge funds) who care less about 
current yield differentials and more about expected returns and who take the other side of the 
trade. In what follows, we use commercial banks as a proxy for yield-oriented investors and 
primary dealers as a proxy for expected return-oriented investors. The logic of this split is based 
on existing accounting conventions, which should arguably have the effect of making banks 
more concerned with current yield than dealers. 
4.3.1.  Commercial banks 
We use quarterly Call Report data on the duration of commercial bank security portfolios 
to test the hypothesis that banks act like the yield-oriented investors in our model. Several factors 
suggest that commercial banks could be prone to behave in a yield-oriented fashion. First, the 
vast majority of commercial banks (weighted by market value) are publicly traded, so bank 
managers with short horizons could be tempted to take actions that boost current reported 
earnings at the expense of longer-term earnings (Stein, 1989).
19 Second, due to GAAP 
accounting conventions, a bank can typically boost near-term accounting earnings simply by 
replacing low-yielding securities in its non-trading accounts with higher-yielding securities.
20 
                                                 
19 Specifically, one could extend the Stein (1989) analysis to consider an earnings management technology in which 
the trade-off between current earnings and expected future earnings (or future earnings risk) varies over time. In the 
present case, the current earnings benefit of taking interest rate risk is greater when the yield curve is steep, so one 
would expect managers with short horizons to take more interest rate risk at those times. 
20 Almost all non-trading account securities are treated as available-for-sale under US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Although these securities are marked to market, unrealized gains and losses do not 
flow through the income statement (as do changes in the value of trading account securities). Instead, mark-to-
market gains and losses flow through other comprehensive income and are accumulated on the balance sheet until 
realized. By contrast, interest income on these securities flows directly through the income statement. Thus, a bank 
can boost its near-term reported earnings by substituting high-yielding for low-yielding securities. A similar effect 
obtains for the small fraction of non-trading securities that are carried on the balance sheet on a historical cost basis 
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This is because interest income on non-trading account securities flows through the income 
statement, but unrealized gains and losses on such securities do not flow through income. Thus, a 
desire to boost current reported profits could lead bank managers to invest more aggressively in 
long-term securities when the yield curve is steep. Finally, because GAAP earnings also drive 
changes in regulatory capital, a bank could boost its capital ratios and generate regulatory slack 
in the near term by engaging in a larger carry trade when the curve is steep. 
  Given the coarse disclosure available in the Call Reports, we focus on a crude measure of 
securities portfolio duration: the aggregate fraction of non-trading account securities with a 
current remaining maturity (for fixed-rate securities) or next re-pricing date (for floating-rate 
securities) of one year or longer: (SECLT/SEC). This measure is available beginning in 1988. 
Using quarterly data, we estimate specifications of the form 
$(10) $(1) (/ ) ( ) , LT t t t t SEC SEC a b y y u         (20) 
where (y
$(10) – y
$(1)) is the yield spread, measured as the difference in current yield between ten- 
and one-year nominal Treasuries. A finding that b > 0 would suggest that banks reach for yield, 
buying more long-term bonds when the yield curve steepens. 
  Table 7 presents the results from this exercise. Column 1 shows a strong positive relation 
between (SECLT/SEC) and (y
$(10) – y
$(1)).
21 In terms of dollar magnitudes, the coefficient in 
Column 1 suggests that a 100 bp decline in the short rate, holding fixed the long rate, leads to a 
1.06 percentage point increase in the share of bank securities that are long term. Bank securities 
have averaged roughly 18.5% of total bank assets since 1988. As of 2010:Q4, commercial bank 
assets were $11,728 billion, so this means that a 100 bp increase in the yield spread raises bank 
demand for long-term securities by $23 billion (= 1.06% × 18.5% × $11,728). So a 300 bp swing 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a.k.a., held-to-maturity securities). The workings of international accounting rules under International Financial 
Reporting Standards are broadly similar to US GAAP in this respect. 
21 We have also tried regressing (SECLT/SEC) on both y
$(10) and y
$(1) separately. The coefficient on y
$(10) is 
positive and significant, and the coefficient on y
$(1) is negative and significant. The absolute magnitudes of the two 
coefficients are similar, consistent with the logic of Eq. (20). 28 
 
in the yield spread, roughly the range over a full easing cycle, would boost demand by $69 
billion. The less-than-one-year versus longer-than-one-year margin is potentially only part of the 
overall portfolio adjustment process. Banks could also be extending their duration within the 
longer-than-one-year bucket. And banks are just one set of investors who could care about 
current income. Thus, the results in Table 7 suggest that the induced shift in total demand from 
all yield-oriented investors could be substantial. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The remaining columns of Table 7 test another implication of the reaching-for-yield 
story. Specifically, if reaching for yield is partially driven by a desire to manage reported 
earnings, then this tendency should be more pronounced for publicly traded banks than for 
privately held banks. If reaching for yield is driven solely by a desire to boost capital ratios and 
maintain regulatory slack, then one would not expect to see much of a difference between public 
and private banks. To investigate this issue, we construct two versions of SECLT/SEC, one for 
public banks and another for private banks. As shown in Column 2, the results for public banks 
are similar to those for all banks. This is true almost by construction because a large majority of 
aggregate commercial banking assets are held by public banks. Consistent with the earnings-
management hypothesis, Column 3 shows that yield-chasing behavior is less pronounced 
amongst private banks. The coefficient of 0.674 on (y
$(10) – y
$(1)) for private banks in Column 3 
is only half of the corresponding coefficient for public banks in Column 2. However, as shown in 
Column 4, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for public banks is the same as 
that for private banks. Thus, the split between public and private banks goes in the direction 
predicted by the earnings-management story, but the evidence on this front is statistically weak. 
Moreover, the positive albeit insignificant coefficient for private banks suggests that a desire to 
maintain regulatory slack could also play some role. 29 
 
Another question has to do with the persistence of the shifts in banks’ demands for long-
term bonds. We find some tentative evidence (not reported) suggesting that these demand shocks 
are gradually reversed over roughly the following eight quarters. One way to see this is to add 
lagged values of (y
$(10) – y
$(1)) to Eq. (20) and then examine the cumulative sum of coefficients 
on contemporaneous and lagged changes in the yield spread. 
4.3.2.  Primary dealers 
Next we examine the Treasury holdings of primary dealers. We think of primary dealers 
as a natural proxy for the expected return-oriented investors in our model, the arbitrageurs who 
accommodate demand shocks coming from yield-oriented investors. Importantly, primary dealer 
activities are housed either within broker-dealers or in commercial bank trading departments. As 
a result, unlike banks’ non-trading accounts, primary dealers operate entirely on mark-to-market 
accounting. So, even if they wanted to manage their earnings, playing the term spread would be 
less of a sure thing for them. 
We work with data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the aggregate 
holdings of primary dealers. A key advantage of this data is that we have high frequency 
observations of dealer holdings by maturity. Specifically, for each week beginning in July 2001, 
we have data on the aggregate net (long minus short) dealer holdings of Treasury bills (all of 
which mature in less than one year) and nominal coupon-bearing Treasuries broken into four 
buckets by remaining maturity: shorter than three years, three to six years, six to 11 years, and 
longer than 11 years.
22 
Measuring the net duration of primary dealer positions is a bit tricky because dealers can 
be net short Treasuries, both in a given maturity bucket and overall. To deal with this 
complication, we compute 
                                                 
22 While primary dealers also report their holdings of TIPS, these are not broken out by maturity and so we do not 
use them to compute our measure of the maturity structure of dealers’ holdings. However, dealers’ holdings of TIPS 
are small relative to their overall Treasury holdings, so this choice has little impact on the resulting measure. 30 
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 (21) 
The numerator is proxy for the net dollar duration of dealers’ Treasury holdings. Then, to scale 
this variable, we divide it by the sum of the absolute positions in each maturity bucket. Thus, the 
scaled variable is like() / ( )
LONG SHORT
tt t t t t DUR LONG DUR SHORT LONG SHORT    .
23 
A variety of factors besides those in our model could impact the duration of dealers’ 
Treasury holdings. In an attempt to control for some of these, we include proxies for the weekly 
change in the scale of dealers’ net positions in Treasuries as well as the change in their net 
positions across all other reportable fixed income asset classes. A related concern is that high-
frequency variation in the maturity structure of dealer positions could be driven by seasonal 
patterns of Treasury issuance; e.g., due to seasonal fluctuations in T-bill supply or the large 
offerings of longer-term notes and bonds in February, May, August, and November. To deal with 
this, we include a full set of week-of-year dummies to soak up any seasonal fluctuations in 
Treasury supply.  
Using weekly data, we then estimate specifications of the form 
$(10) $(1) (). tt t t t NETDUR a b y y u          cx  (22) 
If dealers function as the expected return-oriented investors in our model, we would expect to 
find b < 0. Table 8 presents the results from this exercise. Column 1 shows a strong negative 
relation between DURt and (y
$(10) – y
$(1)). Column 2 adds the various controls, including 
the week-of-year dummies. While the controls substantially increase the overall explanatory 
power of the regression, they have little impact on the coefficient of interest. Columns 3 and 4 
repeat these exercises using a duration measure based on dealers’ holdings of both Treasuries 
                                                 
23 Alternate approaches are to work directly with the numerator of NETDURt or to scale the numerator by the 
amount of outstanding Treasuries. These approaches are less desirable because the resulting measures are impacted 
by variation in the scale of brokers’ holdings relative to market as a whole and, thus, are no longer pure maturity 
measures. Nevertheless, we have experimented with these constructions and generally obtain similar results. 31 
 
and agency debentures, because the latter are seen as a close substitute for Treasuries by many 
investors. This yields broadly similar conclusions. 
  [Insert Table 8 about here] 
  How do the dollar magnitudes implied by Table 8 for dealers compare with those for 
commercial banks? Our estimates suggest that a 100 bp increase in the term spread raises 
commercial banks’ demand for long-term securities by $23 billion. For the sake of argument, 
assume this means that banks buy $23 billion of ten-year Treasury notes and sell a corresponding 
amount of short-term T-bills. Also assume the ten-year notes have a duration of eight years and 
bills have zero duration. To make the comparison, we need to convert our estimates in Table 8 
for broker dealers into dollar magnitudes. To do so, we note that dealers’ average absolute 
position in Treasury securities is on the order of $100 billion over our sample. Thus, our 
estimates in Column 1 of Table 8 suggest that a 100 bp increase in the term spread in a given 
week leads broker-dealers to sell $12.2 billion (= 0.973 × 100 ÷ 8) ten-year notes and purchase a 
corresponding amount of short-term bills. 
  This rough calculation suggests that broker-dealers are acting as economically 
meaningful arbitrageurs, accommodating roughly half of the demand by yield-oriented 
commercial banks in the wake of a shock to the term spread. Other players besides banks also 
could be reaching for yield, and other investors besides broker-dealers also could be acting as 
arbitrageurs. So we cannot claim to have an overall handle on the magnitude of either the 
aggregate demand shock or the arbitrage response. 
  Finally, we examine the dynamics of NETDURt following a shock to the yield spread. 
Specifically, we separately estimate 
$(10) $(1) $(10) $(1)
11 1 () ()[ ( ( )) ] , tt tt t k t tk NETDUR NETDUR a k b k y y y y             (23) 
for k = 0, 1, …, 52. Thus, as above, these regressions differ solely in terms of the differencing 
horizon on the left-hand side (the estimate for k = 0 corresponds to the estimates in Column 1 of 32 
 
Table 8). Fig. 5 plots the coefficients, b(k), versus horizon k. The point estimates suggest that the 
initial impulse to the duration of dealers’ Treasury holdings persists for roughly five months but 
then largely vanishes within nine months. Interestingly, this roughly matches the horizon over 
which the impulse from short-term nominal rates to distant real forwards is reverted away in Fig. 
5. One possible interpretation, in the spirit of Grossman and Miller (1988), is that primary 
dealers function as front-line arbitrageurs in response to a demand shock, but, over time, more 
arbitrage capital enters the market, allowing the dealers to unwind their positions and reversing 
the initial price impact. The wide confidence intervals in Fig. 5 underscore that our estimates of 
the timing of dealers’ unwind are imprecise, so this interpretation is necessarily somewhat 
speculative. 
[Insert Fig. 5 about here] 
4.4.  Other supply and demand channels 
Our theory of yield-oriented investors is one specific example of a supply and demand 
channel that connects monetary policy shocks to real term premia. However, one can tell other 
stories in a similar spirit. For instance, Hanson (2014) and Malkhozov, Mueller, Vedolin, and 
Venter (2014) argue that shifts in expected mortgage refinancing generate shocks to the 
aggregate supply of duration, which impact term premia. A positive shock to interest rates lowers 
expected mortgage refinancing, causing the duration of existing mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) to extend. As a result, the quantity of interest rate risk that bond investors must bear 
increases following a shock to interest rates, leading the term premium to rise. Consistent with 
this, Hanson (2014) finds evidence that measures of aggregate MBS market duration positively 
forecast bond returns and that shifts in MBS duration help explain the sensitivity of distant real 
forwards to short-term nominal rates. 
Another possible demand-side explanation is that investors have a mistaken tendency to 
extrapolate current short-term real rates into the distant future. Our model, in which some 33 
 
investors are yield-oriented due to agency effects, is isomorphic to one in which some investors 
have highly extrapolative beliefs, assuming that the future short rate will be the same as today’s. 
Consistent with this, Cieslak and Povala (2014) argue that investors make systematic 
expectational errors about the near-term path of real short rates. Because we focus on distant 
forward real rates, a behavioral explanation for our results would need to invoke more severe 
mistakes. Investors would need to think that current policy has a large impact on real short rates 
more than ten years into the future. However, such a belief could be consistent with the theory of 
natural expectations developed by Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel (2010), in which expectations are 
a combination of highly extrapolative intuitive expectations and traditional rational expectations. 
And, consistent with this, Piazzesi, Salomao, and Schneider (2013) find that forecasters 
overestimate the persistence of both the level and the slope of the yield curve. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Changes in the stance of monetary policy have a surprisingly strong impact on distant 
forward real interest rates. These movements in forward rates appear to reflect changes in term 
premia, which largely accrue over the next year, as opposed to varying expectations about future 
real rates. Moreover, our evidence suggests that one driving force behind time-varying term 
premia is the behavior of yield-oriented investors, who react to a cut in short rates by increasing 
their demand for longer-term bonds, thereby putting downward pressure on long-term rates. 
Our work raises, but does not answer, a series of questions about the ultimate economic 
importance of this monetary transmission channel. In particular, suppose that a monetary easing 
lowers long-term real rates through the mechanism we have described. What could the resulting 
impact on corporate investment be? On the one hand, the fact that the effect of monetary policy 
on long-term real rates is transitory (i.e., it is reversed after about a year) could seem to imply 
that it would matter less for corporate capital-budgeting decisions. On the other hand, some firms 
could view the temporarily lower long-term rates as a market-timing opportunity, i.e., a window 34 
 
during which it is particularly attractive to issue long-term debt. This in turn could serve to 
stimulate their investment.
24 
While we have focused narrowly on term premia in the Treasury market, the idea that 
monetary policy can influence bond market risk premia has potentially broader implications.  
Much recent work has been motivated by the hypothesis that accommodative monetary policy 
can reduce credit-risk premia.
25 A promising avenue for future work would be to study these two 
channels of monetary transmission in a unified setting. For example, in the context of our model, 
one could allow yield-oriented investors to choose among not only short-term and long-term 
Treasuries, but also defaultable credit instruments (corporate loans, mortgages, etc.). This would 
presumably yield a set of predictions about the comovement of term premia and credit-risk 
premia in response to changes in monetary policy and could be the basis for a wider-ranging and 
more integrated empirical investigation of these phenomena. 
                                                 
24 Similar issues arise when a firm makes investment and financing decisions in the face of a transitory equity 
mispricing. Stein (1996) and Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) argue that the investment of financially constrained 
firms is most sensitive to equity mispricing. One could conjecture that the same would be true here, that is, 
constrained firms would be most likely to adjust investment in response to policy-induced changes in term premia. 
At the same time, the financing (i.e., debt maturity) decisions of unconstrained firms would adjust more as in 
Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010). However, unlike constrained firms, this would not have a large impact on 
their investment. 
25 See, e.g., Rajan (2005), Borio and Zhu (2008), Greenwood and Hanson (2013), Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and 
Saurina (2011), Adrian and Shin (2010), Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011), and Gertler and Karadi (2013). 35 
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Panel A: Response of nominal forwards by maturity 
 
Panel B: Response of real and break-even inflation forwards by maturity 
 
Fig. 1. Response of US forwards to monetary policy news on Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) 
days. Panel A plots the coefficient b$(n) from estimating Eq. (4) on FOMC announcement dates from 
1999 to February 2012: 
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Panel B plots the coefficients bTIPS(n) and b(n) from estimating Eqs. (5) and (6) on FOMC announcement 
dates from 1999 to February 2012: 
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Confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are shown as dashed lines.   
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Panel A: Response of nominal forwards by maturity 
 
Panel B: Response of real and break-even inflation forwards by maturity 
 
Fig. 2. Response of UK forwards to monetary policy news on announcement days. Panel A plots the 
coefficient  b$(n) from estimating Eq. (4) on UK monetary policy announcement dates from 1994 to 
February 2012: 
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Panel B plots the coefficients bTIPS(n) and b(n) from estimating Eqs. (5) and (6) on UK monetary policy 
announcement dates from 1994 to February 2012: 
() $ ( 2 ) () () $ ( 2 ) () () ()   a n d     () () .
TIPS n TIPS n n n
t TIPS TIPS t t t t t f a nb n y f a nb n y

               
Confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are shown as dashed lines.   
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Panel A: Response of nominal forwards by maturity 
 
Panel B: Response of real and break-even inflation forwards by maturity 
 
Fig. 3. Instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the response of US Treasury forward rates to monetary 
policy news. Panel A plots the coefficient b$(n) from IV estimation of Eq. (4) on Federal Open Markets 
Committee announcement dates from 1999 to February 2012: 
$( ) $(2) $( )
$$ () () .
nn
tt t fa n b n y       
Panel B plots the coefficients bTIPS(n) and b(n) from IV estimation of Eqs. (5) and (6): 
() $ ( 2 ) () () $ ( 2 ) () () ()   a n d     () () .
TIPS n TIPS n n n
t TIPS TIPS t t t t t t f a nbn y f a nb n y

              
For an announcement on day t, we compute the two-day change from t-1 to t+1. We instrument for the 
two-day change in the two-year yield using the change in narrow 60-minute window surrounding the 
announcement as well as the 60-minute change raised to the second and third powers. t-statistics, based 
on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets.
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Panel A: Nominal forwards, 1987+, all days  Panel B: Nominal forwards, 1987+, FOMC only 
  
Panel C: Real forwards, 1999+, all days  Panel D: Real forwards, 1999+, FOMC only 
 
Fig. 4. Impulse response of ten-year US forwards to short-term nominal rates. Panel A plots the coefficient b$(k) from estimating Eq. (11), using 
all days from 1987 to February 2012: 
$(10) $(10) $(2) $(2) $(10)
1$ $ 1 1 () ()( , ) tk t t t tk ffa k b k y y            
for horizons k = 1, …, 250 days. Panel B plots repeats the same exercise, restricting attention to onlyFederal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) 
dates from 1987 to February 2012. Panel C plots the coefficient bTIPS(k) from estimating Eq. (12) on all days from 1999 to February 2012: 
(10) (10) $(2) $(2) (10)
11 1 () ()( . )
TIPS TIPS TIPS
t k t TIPS TIPS t t t k ffa k b k y y            
Panel D plots repeats this exercise, restricting attention to only FOMC dates from 1999 to February 2012. Confidence intervals, based on Newey 
and West (1987) standard errors to account for the overlapping nature of the variables, are shown as dashed lines. In Panels A and C, we allow for 
serial correlation at up to 1.5 × k lags (to the nearest integer). In Panels B and D, we allow for serial correlation between FOMC meetings at up to 
1.5 × (k / 25) lags, because FOMC meetings occur roughly every 25 business days on average. 
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Fig. 5. Impulse response of primary dealer NETDUR to the yield spread. The figure plots the coefficient 
b(k) from estimating the following regressions using weekly data from July 2001 to February 2012: 
$(10) $(1) $(10) $(1)
11 1 () ()[ ( ( )) ] , tt tt t k tk t NETDUR NETDUR a k b k y y y y           
for horizons k = 0, 1, …, 52 weeks. Confidence intervals, based on Newey and West (1987) standard 
errors to account for the overlapping nature of the variables, are shown as dashed lines. We allow for 
serial correlation at up to 1.5 × k lags (to the nearest integer). 
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Table 1 
Response of US Treasury forward rates to monetary policy news.  
 
Regressions of changes in nominal, real, and break-even inflation instantaneous forward rates (X = $, 
TIPS, and ) on changes in the two-year nominal yield on Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) 
announcement days from 1999 through February 2012: 
() $ ( 2 ) () () () .
Xn Xn
tX Xtt fa n b n y       
We estimate these regressions for maturities of n = 5, …, 20. For an announcement on day t, we compute 
the two-day change from t-1 to t+1. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets. 
We exclude five FOMC announcements dates from 2009 to 2011, when there was significant news about 
the Federal Reserve’s large scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs. Daily estimates of nominal forward 
rates, real forward rates, and break-even inflation forward rates are based on Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
Wright (2007, 2010). The data, updated regularly by Federal Reserve Board staff, are available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html and 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200805/200805abs.html. 
 
  Nominal forwards  Real forwards  Inflation forwards 
n  b$(n)  [t]          R
2  bTIPS(n) [t]         R
2  b(n)  [t]          R
2 
5  0.843  [6.07]     0.30  0.653 [5.98]    0.24  0.190  [2.46]     0.05 
6  0.729  [4.90]     0.21  0.563 [5.77]    0.20  0.166  [1.80]     0.04 
7  0.634  [4.22]     0.16  0.505 [5.58]    0.18  0.129  [1.22]     0.02 
8  0.557  [3.84]     0.13  0.467 [5.24]    0.17  0.090  [0.80]     0.01 
9  0.496  [3.64]     0.11  0.441 [4.88]    0.17  0.055  [0.48]     0.00 
10  0.446  [3.54]     0.09  0.421 [4.63]    0.18  0.025  [0.23]     0.00 
11  0.405  [3.47]     0.09  0.405 [4.47]    0.18  0.001  [0.01]     0.00 
12  0.371  [3.37]     0.08  0.390 [4.37]    0.18  -0.018  [-0.18]     0.00 
13  0.342  [3.21]     0.07  0.376 [4.29]    0.17  -0.034  [-0.35]     0.00 
14  0.315  [2.99]     0.07  0.362 [4.21]    0.17  -0.047  [-0.48]     0.00 
15  0.291  [2.73]     0.06  0.350 [4.10]    0.15  -0.059  [-0.58]     0.00 
16  0.267  [2.45]     0.06  0.338 [3.95]    0.14  -0.071  [-0.65]     0.01 
17  0.244  [2.17]     0.05  0.327 [3.76]    0.13  -0.083  [-0.70]     0.01 
18  0.222  [1.89]     0.04  0.316 [3.56]    0.12  -0.094  [-0.74]     0.01 
19  0.199  [1.62]     0.04  0.306 [3.36]    0.11  -0.107  [-0.77]     0.01 
20  0.176  [1.36]     0.03  0.296 [3.15]    0.09  -0.120  [-0.79]     0.01 45 
 
Table 2  
Robustness checks for US.  
 
Regressions of changes in nominal, real, and break-even inflation instantaneous forward rates (X = $, TIPS, and ) on changes in various short rates on Federal 
Open Markets Committee (FOMC) announcement days. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets. We first vary the window (one-day 
versus two-day changes) used to compute changes in long-term forwards and short-term rates. We next use a variety of different proxies for monetary policy 
news on FOMC announcement dates, including the “future path of policy” news factor as in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a). Data on federal funds 
futures and eurodollar futures are from Bloomberg. Next, we vary the sample. Finally, we address concerns about liquidity effects using data on inflation swaps. 
We work with ten-year rates ten-year forward here. The Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS)-implied forward real rates are from Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
Wright (2010). We use data on zero-coupon inflation swaps from Bloomberg to construct proxies for real forwards and forward inflation that do not rely on TIPS 
data. Our proxy for the real forward rate is the difference between nominal Treasury forwards from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) and forward inflation 
computed using zero-coupon inflation swaps. Because inflation swap data are available only beginning in July 2004 and are sporadic until August 2005, these 
regressions use 57 observations. 
 
    Nominal forwards  Real forwards  Inflation forwards 
  Observations  b$(10) [t]         R
2  bTIPS(10) [t]        R
2  b(10) [t]       R
2 
Baseline:                  
Two-year UST  107  0.446  [3.54]     0.09  0.421  [4.63]     0.18  0.025  [0.23]     0.00 
Vary proxy for Monetary Policy news                  
Two-year US Treasury, one-day change  107  0.245  [2.98]     0.08  0.215  [2.90]     0.13  0.021  [0.30]     0.00 
One-year US Treasury  107  0.186  [1.30]     0.01  0.287  [2.60]     0.07  -0.100  [-0.89]     0.01 
One-year US Treasury, one-year forward  107  0.505  [5.13]     0.17  0.408  [5.42]     0.24  0.097  [1.14]     0.02 
Three-quarter forward eurodollar  107  0.239  [2.39]     0.07  0.286  [4.43]     0.20  -0.046  [-0.66]     0.01 
Six-quarter forward eurodollar  107  0.398  [4.23]     0.23  0.326  [6.33]     0.33  0.072  [0.95]     0.02 
Nine-month forward fed funds  89  0.258  [1.85]     0.03  0.354  [3.72]     0.11  -0.096  [-0.82]     0.01 
12-month forward fed funds  74  0.308  [1.90]     0.04  0.401  [3.42]     0.14  -0.093  [-0.75]     0.01 
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a) path factor  107  0.274  [2.43]     0.10  0.279  [3.75]     0.23  -0.005  [-0.07]     0.00 
Vary sample                  
Add five quantitative easing dates  112  0.504  [3.30]     0.10  0.455  [4.97]     0.18  0.049  [0.40]     0.00 
Regular meeting  100  0.452  [4.16]     0.09  0.383  [4.04]     0.14  0.069  [0.73]     0.01 
Unscheduled meeting  7  0.565  [2.62]     0.38  0.668  [3.66]     0.67  -0.103  [-0.38]     0.02 
Add minutes dates  212  0.528  [5.85]     0.17  0.312  [4.76]     0.14  0.203  [2.04]     0.04 
Explore liquidity effects                  
TIPS-implied forwards  57  0.255  [1.43]    0.04  0.440  [2.97]    0.16  -0.186  [-1.11]    0.04 
Inflation swap-implied forwards  57  0.255  [1.43]    0.04  0.838  [2.41]    0.20  -0.583  [-1.50]    0.12 
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Table 3  
Response of UK gilt forward rates to monetary policy news.  
 
Regressions of changes in nominal, real, and break-even inflation instantaneous forward rates (X = $, 
TIPS, and ) on changes in the two-year nominal gilt yield on UK monetary policy announcement days 
from 1994 to February 2012: 
() $ ( 2 ) () () () .
Xn Xn
tX Xtt fa n b n y       
We estimate these regressions for maturities of n = 5, …, 20. For an announcement on day t, we compute 
the two-day change from t-1 to t+1. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets. 
Beginning in June 1997, our policy announcement dates correspond to meetings of the Bank of England 
(BOE) Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/decisions.aspx. From January 1994 to May 1997, 
we use the dates of the Monthly Monetary Meetings between the Governor of the BOE and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer from Table 6.1 of (Cobham, 2002). We exclude six MPC announcements 
dates when there was significant news about the BOE’s quantitative easing operations. The UK yield 
curve data are based on the methods described in Andersen and Sleath (1999). The data are available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/yieldcurve/default.aspx. 
 
  Nominal forwards  Real forwards  Inflation forwards 
n  b$(n)  [t]          R
2  bTIPS(n) [t]         R
2  b(n)  [t]          R
2 
5  0.591 [7.24]  0.25 0.396 [8.04] 0.30 0.196 [3.07]  0.05
6  0.510 [6.44]  0.18 0.356 [7.85] 0.27 0.154 [2.54]  0.03
7  0.445 [5.74]  0.13 0.324 [7.88] 0.25 0.121 [1.97]  0.02
8  0.392 [5.15]  0.11 0.298 [7.81] 0.23 0.094 [1.49]  0.01
9  0.345 [4.61]  0.09 0.274 [7.48] 0.21 0.071 [1.08]  0.01
10  0.300 [4.05]  0.07 0.254 [6.89] 0.19 0.046 [0.69]  0.00
11  0.258 [3.43]  0.05 0.236 [6.16] 0.17 0.021 [0.30]  0.00
12  0.218 [2.80]  0.04 0.221 [5.45] 0.14 -0.003  [-0.04]  0.00
13  0.181 [2.23]  0.03 0.207 [4.83] 0.13 -0.026  [-0.31]  0.00
14  0.151 [1.76]  0.02 0.195 [4.33] 0.11 -0.045  [-0.50]  0.00
15  0.126 [1.41]  0.01 0.185 [3.93] 0.10 -0.059  [-0.62]  0.00
16  0.108 [1.17]  0.01 0.177 [3.63] 0.09 -0.069  [-0.70]  0.01
17  0.095 [1.01]  0.01 0.171 [3.40] 0.08 -0.076  [-0.73]  0.01
18  0.088 [0.92]  0.01 0.166 [3.23] 0.07 -0.078  [-0.74]  0.01
19  0.085 [0.89]  0.01 0.162 [3.10] 0.07 -0.077  [-0.72]  0.01
20  0.085 [0.89]  0.01 0.165 [3.08] 0.07 -0.077  [-0.70]  0.01
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Table 4 
Instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the response of ten-year US Treasury forward rates to monetary policy news.  
 
This table shows regressions of changes in ten-year nominal, real, and break-even inflation forward rates (X = $, TIPS, and ) on changes in the 
two-year nominal yield from 1999 through February 2012: 
(10) $(2) (10) (10) (10) .
XX
tXX t t fab y       
Row 1 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates that restrict attention to Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) announcement dates. 
Rows 2 and 3 show the corresponding IV estimates. In Row 2, we instrument for the change in the two-year yield using the change in the two-year 
yields in a narrow 60-minute window surrounding the announcements (60-m . Row 3 uses the 60-minute change as well as the 60-minute 
change raised to the second and third powers (60-m poly). t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets. We also report the 
first stage F-statistic on the instruments. We do not have intraday data for three FOMC announcements in our sample, so all estimates in this table 
are based on 104 announcement dates.  
 
Specification  Nominal forwards  Real forwards  Inflation forwards 
Estimator  Instruments  1
st Stage Fb $(10) [t] R
2 bTIPS(10) [t] R
2 b(10) [t] R
2
       
OLS —  — 0.415 [3.32] 0.09 0.422 [4.58] 0.18 -0.007 [-0.06] 0.00
IV  60-m   20.64 0.381 [1.05] 0.09 0.561 [2.15] 0.16 -0.180 [-0.98] 0.00
IV  60-m poly  13.11 0.465 [1.45] 0.08 0.612 [2.76] 0.14 -0.147 [-0.83] 0.00
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Table 5 
Response of US long-term forward rates to changes in short-term rates.  
 
Regressions of changes real instantaneous forward rates on changes in short-term nominal rates on all 
days, allowing for a differential response on Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) announcement 
dates (excluding any quantitative easing dates): 
$(2) $(2) () () . tt
TIPS n Xn
tt t t t yy fa b c F O M C dF O M C             
We estimate these regressions for five-, ten-, and 20-year forwards using daily data from 1999 through 
February 2012. Standard errors are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial 
correlation at up to two lags. 
 
  Five-year forwards Ten-year forwards 20-year forwards
y
$(2)  0.493 0.268 0.240
  [15.90] [12.30] [9.32]
FOMC  -0.003 -0.005 -0.010
  [-0.26] [-0.58] [-1.20]
y
$(2) × FOMC  0.160 0.153 0.057
  [1.47] [1.69] [0.60]
Constant  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
  [-0.61] [-0.38] [-0.23]
Number of observations 3,283 3,283 3,283
R
2  0.22 0.11 0.05
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Table 6 
Mean reversion in forward rates.  
 
This table forecasts of 12-month changes in forward rates using changes in forward rates over the past three months: 
(9) (10) (10) (10) (10)
11 / 4 1 (),
XX X X X
tt t t t t fa b ff f 
         cx  
for X = $ and TIPS. The regressions are estimated with monthly data. To deal with the overlapping nature of the 12-
month returns t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation at up to 
18 lags. We estimate these regressions with and without controlling for forward rate spread,     
          
     . The 
table shows ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) estimates. In the IV specifications, we 
instrument for (   
            / 
     ) using the change in nominal short rates over the past three months, (  
$          / 
$    ). 
We decompose the change in ten-year forwards into components that occurred on Federal Open Markets Committee 
(FOMC) days and on all other days: (   
            / 
     ) = (   
            / 
     )FOMC + (   
            / 
     )NONFOMC. In IV versions 
of these regressions, we instrument for (   
            / 
     )FOMC and (   
            / 
     )NONFOMC with (  
$          / 
$    )FOMC and 
(  
$          / 
$    )NONFOMC. Panel A shows nominal forecasting results from 1987 to February 2012. Panel B shows real 
forecasting results from 1999 to February 2012. 
 
 OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
Panel A: Forecasting changes in nominal forward rates, 1987+ 
   
$            / 
$      -0.343  -1.078  -0.284  -1.228     
  [-3.21]  [-2.13]  [-2.47]  [-2.53]     
    
$            / 
$     
    
         -0.564 -1.369 -0.561 -1.774 
         [-1.69] [-0.79] [-1.64] [-1.17] 
    
$            / 
$     
       
         -0.321 -1.084 -0.256 -1.238 
         [-2.86] [-2.04] [-2.10] [-2.39] 
   
$         
$        -0.137 -0.112     -0.138 -0.112 
     [-3.15] [-2.12]     [-3.21] [-2.10] 
Constant -0.281  -0.304  0.054  -0.037 -0.283 -0.308  0.055 -0.042 
  [-2.76] [-2.59]  [0.37] [-0.19] [-2.78] [-2.61]  [0.37] [-0.21] 
Number  of  observations  289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 
R
2  0.04   0.13   0.04   0.14   
Panel B: Forecasting changes in real forward rates, 1999+ 
   
                / 
          -0.514  -0.728  -0.522  -0.811     
  [-3.99]  [-1.27]  [-5.21]  [-1.88]     
    
                / 
         
    
         -0.567 -1.081 -0.533 -0.590 
         [-2.05] [-1.75] [-2.03] [-1.11] 
    
                / 
         
       
         -0.498 -0.759 -0.519 -0.792 
         [-3.23] [-1.38] [-4.00] [-1.95] 
   
             
            -0.159 -0.159     -0.159 -0.160 
     [-3.75] [-3.75]     [-3.68] [-3.70] 
Constant  -0.228  -0.234 0.164 0.158  -0.229  -0.240 0.164 0.163 
  [-2.85]  [-2.70] [1.54] [1.44]  [-2.88]  [-2.70] [1.49] [1.39] 
Number  of  observations  142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
R
2  0.12   0.37   0.12   0.37  
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Table 7 
Duration of commercial bank securities portfolios and the yield spread.  
 
Regressions of quarterly changes in the aggregate duration of bank securities portfolios on quarterly 
changes in the yield spread from 1988 to 2010: 
$(10) $(1) (/ ) ( ) .
LTt t t t SEC SEC a b y y u         
t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets. SECLT/SEC is the fraction of non-
trading account securities with a remaining maturity (for fixed rate securities) or next re-pricing date (for 
floating rate securities) of one year or more. Column 1 shows the result for all banks. Columns 2 and 3 
show results for publicly traded banks and for private banks, respectively. Finally, Column 4 shows the 
difference between public and private banks. Thus, the t-statistics in Column 4 enables one to test the 
hypothesis that the coefficients for public and private banks are equal. We classify a commercial bank as 
publicly traded if its parent bank holding company has a valid Center for Research in Security Prices link 
in the table maintained by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This linking table is 
available online at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html. 
 
All  
banks 
Public  
banks
Private  
banks
Difference: 
Public – Private
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(y
($(10) – y
($(1))  1.060  1.229 0.674 0.555
[3.76] [3.07] [1.33] [0.75]
Constant  0.009  0.003 -0.009 0.012
[0.08] [0.02] [-0.07] [0.07]
Number of observations  91  91  91  91 
R²  0.13  0.11  0.04  0.01 
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Table 8 
Duration of primary dealer Treasury holdings and the yield spread.  
 
Regressions of weekly changes in the aggregate duration primary dealer Treasury holdings on weekly 
changes in the yield spread from July 2001 to February 2012: 
$(10) $(1) () .
tt t t NETDUR a b y y u         
NETDURt is defined in Eq. (21). The even-numbered columns include controls for the weekly change in 
the scale of dealers’ net position in Treasuries and all other reportable fixed income asset classes as well 
as a full set of week-of-year dummies. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets. 
Columns 1 and 2 show this exercise for our baseline measure of the duration of dealers’ Treasury 
holdings. Columns 3 and 4 repeat this exercise using a more comprehensive duration measure based on 
dealers’ holdings of both Treasuries and agency debentures. The primary dealer data are available on-line 
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/gsds/search.cfm. 
 
Treasury holdings  Treasury plus agency holdings 
(1) (2) (3)  (4)
(y
($(10) – y
($(1))  -0.973 -0.884 -0.451  -0.401
[-3.12] [-3.00] [-3.85]  [-3.53]
Constant  0.004 -0.355 0.002  -0.118
[0.12] [-0.94] [0.17]  [-0.84]
Controls  No Yes No  Yes
Number of observations  555 555 555  555
R²  0.03 0.15 0.04  0.20
 